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We ﬁrst embed Pearce’s equilibrium logic and Ferraris’s propositional general logic
programs in Lin and Shoham’s logic of GK, a nonmonotonic modal logic that has been
shown to include as special cases both Reiter’s default logic in the propositional case and
Moore’s autoepistemic logic. From this embedding, we obtain a mapping from Ferraris’s
propositional general logic programs to circumscription, and show that this mapping can
be used to check the strong equivalence between two propositional logic programs in
classical logic. We also show that Ferraris’s propositional general logic programs can be
extended to the ﬁrst-order case, and our mapping from Ferraris’s propositional general
logic programs to circumscription can be extended to the ﬁrst-order case as well to provide
a semantics for these ﬁrst-order general logic programs.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Prologue
It gives us great pleasure to be able to contribute this work to this special issue of Artiﬁcial Intelligence in honor of John
McCarthy. Like so many others, we have been inﬂuenced greatly by McCarthy and his work for as long as we have known AI.
This particular work relates McCarthy’s circumscription to several other nonmonotonic logics, and obviously could not have
been done without McCarthy’s pioneering work on nonmonotonic reasoning in general and circumscription in particular.
1. Introduction
Answer Set Programming (ASP) is a new paradigm of constraint-based programming based on logic programming with
answer set semantics [9,13,17]. It started out with normal logic programs, which are programs that can have negation but
not disjunction. Driven by the need of applications, various extensions have been proposed. These include disjunctive logic
programs [5,6], nested expressions [7], cardinality and weight constraints [16], and others. Recently, Ferraris [2] proposed
to view formulas in propositional logic as logic programs and showed that they include as special cases all the above
mentioned classes of logic programs. In particular, Ferraris [2] provided a stable model semantics for these formulas using
a transformation similar to the original Gelfond–Lifschitz transformation, and showed that this semantics coincides with
Pearce’s equilibrium logic [19].
In this paper, we show that this general stable model semantics can be embedded in Lin and Shoham’s logic of GK
(Grounded Knowledge) [11]. Besides showing the generality of Lin and Shoham’s logic, which was proposed as a general
logic for nonmonotonic reasoning, this embedding allows us to obtain a way to check in classical propositional logic whether
any given two logic programs are strongly equivalent in almost the same way as in [12]. It also allows us to obtain a
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mapping normal logic programs to circumscription. As it turned out, this mapping, when extended to ﬁrst-order case, yields
a semantics to ﬁrst-order general logic programs that is similar to the one proposed recently by Ferraris et al. [4].
We ﬁrst brieﬂy review Lin and Shoham’s logic of GK, Ferraris’s general logic programs, and Pearce’s equilibrium logic.
2. Logic of GK
The language of the logic of GK is a modal propositional language with two modal operators, K , for knowledge, and A,
for assumption. Given a set Atom of atoms (also called variables or primitive propositions), formulas in the logic of GK are
deﬁned inductively below in BNF notation:
F ::= ⊥ | p | K (F ) | A(F ) | ¬F | F ∧ F | F ∨ F | F → F ,
where p ∈ Atom, and ⊥ is a constant standing for falsity. Formulas without modal operators are called base formulas.
The semantics of the logic of GK is deﬁned through Kripke interpretations. A Kripke interpretation M is a tuple
〈W ,π, RK , RA, s〉, where W is a nonempty set whose elements are called possible worlds, π is a function that maps a
possible world to a truth assignment on Atom, RK and RA are binary relations over W representing the accessibility re-
lations for K and A, respectively, and s ∈ W , called the actual world of M . The satisfaction relation |
 between a Kripke
interpretation M = 〈W ,π, RK , RA, s〉 and a formula F is deﬁned inductively as follows:
• M |
 ⊥;
• M |
 p if π(s)(p) = 1, where p ∈ Atom;
• M |
 ¬F iff M |
 F ;
• M |
 F ∧ G iff M |
 F and M |
 G;
• M |
 F ∨ G iff M |
 F or M |
 G;
• M |
 F → G iff M |
 F or M |
 G;
• M |
 K (F ) iff 〈W ,π, RK , RA,w〉 |
 F for any w ∈ W , such that (s,w) ∈ RK ;
• M |
 A(F ) iff 〈W ,π, RK , RA,w〉 |
 F for any w ∈ W , such that (s,w) ∈ RA .
We say that a Kripke interpretation M is a model of a formula F if M satisﬁes F . In the following, given a Kripke interpre-
tation M , we let
K (M) = {F ∣∣ F is a base formula and M |
 K (F )},
A(M) = {F ∣∣ F is a base formula and M |
 A(F )}.
Notice that K (M) and A(M) are always closed under classical logical entailment. In the following, for any set X of formulas,
we let Th(X) be the logical closure of X under classical logic.
Informally in GK, one assumes A(M) and minimizes K (M). When the assumed A(M) turns out to be the same as the
minimal K (M), an equilibrium is reached, and the assumption is said to be “justiﬁed” or the knowledge is said to be
“grounded”. Formally, GK models are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (GK models). Given a formula F , a Kripke interpretation M is a minimal model of F if M is a model of F and
there does not exist another model M1 of F such that A(M1) = A(M) and K (M1) ⊂ K (M). We say that M is a GK model1 if
M is a minimal model of F and K (M) = A(M).
Lin and Shoham showed that the logic of GK can be used to capture Reiter’s default logic [20] and Moore’s auto-epistemic
logic [15]. As a consequence, normal logic programs under stable model semantics can be captured in the logic of GK as
well. Speciﬁcally, they showed that a normal rule
r ← p1, . . . , pn,notq1, . . . ,notqm
can be translated into the following sentence in the logic of GK:
Kp1 ∧ · · · ∧ Kpn ∧ ¬Aq1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Aqm → Kr. (1)
They also showed that this translation extends to disjunctive logic programs.
In this paper, we shall show that general logic programs proposed by Ferraris [2] can be captured in the logic of GK as
well.
1 In [11], GK models are called preferred models.
266 F. Lin, Y. Zhou / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 264–2773. General logic programs
Given a set Atom of atoms, general logic programs [3] are formulas deﬁned inductively below in BNF notation:
F ::= ⊥ | p | F ∧ F | F ∨ F | F → F ,
where p ∈ Atom. Notice that there is no negation in the language. Instead, for any formula F , ¬F is considered to be a
shorthand for F → ⊥.
A set X ⊆ Atom of atoms can be considered as a truth assignment in the straightforward way:
X |
 ⊥, X |
 p iff p ∈ X,
and the usual deﬁnition for the logical connectives.
The stable models of a formula (general logic program) are deﬁned by a modiﬁed extended Gelfond–Lifschitz transforma-
tion. Given a general logic program F , and a set X of atoms, the reduct of F under X [2], written F X , is the formula obtained
from F by replacing each maximal subformula that is not classically satisﬁed by X with ⊥. Thus for example,
(¬F )X =
{, X |
 ¬F ,
⊥, otherwise.
Now a set X of atoms is a stable model of a general logic program F if:
(i) X |
 F X ;
(ii) there is no proper subset X1 of X , such that X1 |
 F X .
Example 3.1. Consider the following three general logic programs.
P = ¬p → q,
Q = ¬p ∨ p,
R = p → ¬¬p,
where p, q are atoms. The maximal subformula in P that is false under {q} is p, thus P {q} is ¬⊥ → q, which is satisﬁed
by {q}, but not by ∅. Therefore, {q} is a stable model of P . On the other hand, P {p} is ⊥ → ⊥, which is satisﬁed by {p} as
well as its subset ∅. Therefore, {p} is not a stable model of P . It can be seen that {q} is the only stable model of P . Similarly,
it can be shown that Q has two stable models, {p} and ∅, and R has exactly one stable model ∅.
4. Pearce’s equilibrium logic
Pearce’s equilibrium logic [19] is based on the logic of here-and-there, a non-classical logic. Given a set Atom of atoms,
formulas of Atom are exactly the same as in the case of general logic programs. Thus, negation in equilibrium logic is
considered a shorthand as well.
The semantics of the logic of here-and-there is deﬁned in terms of HT-interpretations, which are pairs 〈X, Y 〉 of sets
of atoms such that X ⊆ Y . The HT satisfaction relation2 |
 between an HT-interpretation 〈X, Y 〉 and a formula F is deﬁned
recursively as follows:
• For p ∈ Atom, 〈X, Y 〉 |
 p if p ∈ X ;
• 〈X, Y 〉 |
 ⊥;
• 〈X, Y 〉 |
 F ∧ G if 〈X, Y 〉 |
 F and 〈X, Y 〉 |
 G;
• 〈X, Y 〉 |
 F ∨ G if 〈X, Y 〉 |
 F or 〈X, Y 〉 |
 G;
• 〈X, Y 〉 |
 F → G if
(i) 〈X, Y 〉 |
 F or 〈X, Y 〉 |
 G , and
(ii) Y |
 F → G .
An HT interpretation 〈X, Y 〉 is an equilibrium model of a formula F if X = Y , 〈X, Y 〉 |
 F , and there is no proper subset X1 of
X , such that 〈X1, Y 〉 |
 F . Ferraris [2] showed that the stable models of a formula are essentially the same as its equilibrium
models.
Theorem 1 (Ferraris). Let X be a set of atoms and F a general logic program, X is a stable model of F iff 〈X, X〉 is an equilibriummodel
of F .
2 We overload |
, and use it to stand for satisfaction relations for modal logic, classical logic, and logic of here-and-there. Which one it stands for should
be clear from the context.
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In this section, we present a translation from a general logic program (also a formula in equilibrium logic) to a formula
in the logic of GK, and show that under the translation, stable models (thus equilibrium models) coincide with GK models
in the logic of GK.
Given a general logic program F , we deﬁne two formulas F A and FGK in the logic of GK as follows:
(1) F A is obtained from F by simultaneously replacing each atom p by Ap.
(2) FGK is deﬁned inductively as follows:
• ⊥GK = ⊥;
• For p ∈ Atom, pGK = Kp;
• (F  G)GK = FGK  GGK ( is ∧ or ∨);
• (F → G)GK = (FGK → GGK) ∧ (F → G)A .
It can be shown that for a normal logic program F , FGK is equivalent to the translation by Lin and Shoham [11] given in
Section 2 under
∧
p∈Atom
Kp→ Ap, (2)
and that for any formula W in the logic of GK, M is a GK model of W iff M is a GK model of W ∧ (2).
This translation is also similar to the mapping from formulas in equilibrium logic to quantiﬁed boolean formulas given
in [18]. We shall discuss this in more detail in a later section.
To illustrate, consider the three programs in Example 3.1. PGK is
(
(¬p)GK → qGK
)∧ (¬p → q)A,
which is
(
(¬pGK ∧ ¬pA) → Kq
)∧ (¬pA → qA),
which is
(
(¬Kp∧ ¬Ap) → Kq)∧ (¬Ap→ Aq). (3)
Now let M be a model of the above sentence. If p ∈ A(M), then (3) holds no matter what K (M) is, thus its minimal model
is K (M) = Th(∅), so cannot be a GK model. Now if p /∈ A(M), then (3) is equivalent to (¬Kp → Kq) ∧ Aq. Thus q ∈ A(M).
Thus if M is a minimal model, then K (M) = Th({q}). And if A(M) = K (M), then M is a GK model. What we have shown
here is that in any GK model M of (3), K (M) = A(M) = Th({q}). The existence of such a model is apparent.
It can be similarly shown that QGK is equivalent to Ap → Kp, and that M is a GK model of QGK iff K (M) = A(M) =
Th({p}) or K (M) = A(M) = Th({}). And RGK is equivalent to Kp→ Ap, and that M is a GK model of RGK iff K (M) = A(M) =
Th({}). Thus for these three programs, their GK models correspond one-to-one with their stable models. In general, we
have the following result. Proofs of the theorems are in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. Let X be a set of atoms and F a general logic program. The following two statements are equivalent.
(1) X is a stable model of F .
(2) There is a GK model M of FGK such that K (M) = A(M) = Th(X).
6. From general logic programs and equilibrium logic to circumscription
Given their mapping (1) from normal logic program to the logic of GK, Lin and Shoham [11] showed that stable model
semantics for normal logic programs can be captured in circumscription [14] as follows. Given a set Atom = {p,q, . . .} of
atoms, let Atom′ = {p′,q′, . . .} be a new set of atoms. Given a normal logic program F , let C(F ) be the conjunction of the
sentences:
p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn ∧ ¬q′1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬q′m → r,
for each rule
r ← p1, . . . , pn,notq1, . . . ,notqm
in F . Lin and Shoham [11] showed that X is a stable model of F iff X ∪ X ′ is a model of
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p∈Atom
(
p ↔ p′)∧ Circum(C(F );Atom),
where Circum(W ; Q ) is the circumscription of the atoms in Q in W (with all other atoms ﬁxed). Lin and Shoham also
showed that this result can be extended to disjunctive logic programs. Using the same idea, we can capture the stable
model semantics of general logic program and equilibrium logic in circumscription as well.
Let Atom be a set of atoms. Again let Atom′ = {p′ | p ∈ Atom} be a set of new atoms. For any X ⊆ Atom, let X ′ = {p′ | p ∈
X}. Given any general logic program F in the language Atom, let C(F ) be the result obtained from FGK by replacing every
Kp in it by p and every Ap in it by p′ , for every p ∈ Atom.
Theorem 3. For any general logic program F in the language Atom, any set X ⊆ Atom, the following two statements are equivalent
(1) There is a GK model M of FGK such that K (M) = A(M) = Th(X).
(2) X ∪ X ′ is a model of∧
p∈Atom
(
p ↔ p′)∧ Circum(C(F );Atom). (4)
Interestingly, our translation C(F ) that embeds general logic programs and equilibrium logic in circumscription is exactly
the same as the one by Pearce et al. [18] for embedding equilibrium logic in quantiﬁed boolean formulas. They showed that
〈X, X〉 is an equilibrium model of a formula F in equilibrium logic iff X ′ is a model of the following quantiﬁed boolean
formula:
F ′ ∧ ¬∃Atom((Atom< Atom′)∧ C(F )),
where F ′ is the formula obtained from F by replacing every atom p by p′ , and Atom< Atom′ stands for∧
p∈Atom
(
p → p′)∧ ¬ ∧
p∈Atom
(
p′ → p).
While propositional circumscription is also a quantiﬁed boolean formula, it is a well studied formalism. There are many
known results about circumscription that we can use. Mapping logic programs to circumscription can help us better under-
stand both formalisms.
Notice that the formula
∧
p∈Atom(p ↔ p′) is equivalent to[ ∧
p∈Atom
(
p → p′)
]
∧
[ ∧
p∈Atom
(
p′ → p)
]
.
Thus (4) is equivalent to[ ∧
p∈Atom
(
p → p′)
]
∧
[ ∧
p∈Atom
(
p′ → p)
]
∧ Circum(C(F );Atom),
which is equivalent to[ ∧
p∈Atom
(
p′ → p)
]
∧ Circum
(
C(F ) ∧
∧
p∈Atom
(
p → p′);Atom
)
,
as the atoms (predicates) to be minimized occur only negatively in
∧
p∈Atom(p → p′). Putting the formula
∧
p∈Atom(p → p′)
into the theory in the circumscription is good as it can be used to simplify C(F ).
Proposition 6.1. If
∧
p∈Atom(p → p′) |
 C(F ) ↔ W , then (4) is equivalent to∧
p∈Atom
(
p ↔ p′)∧ Circum(W ;Atom).
Consider again the three programs in Example 3.1. For P , C(P ) is equivalent to ¬p ∧ ¬p′ → q, which is equivalent to
¬p′ → q under (p → p′) ∧ (q → q′). Thus for this program, (4) is equivalent to
(
p ↔ p′)∧ (q ↔ q′)∧ Circum(¬p′ → q; {p,q}),
which is equivalent to
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p ↔ p′)∧ (q ↔ q′)∧ ¬p ∧ (¬p′ ↔ q),
which has a unique model {q,q′}.
For Q = ¬p ∨ p, C(Q ) is equivalent to p′ → p. Thus for this program, (4) is equivalent to
(
p ↔ p′)∧ Circum(p′ → p; {p}),
which is equivalent to p ↔ p′ , which has two models p and ¬p.
7. First-order general logic programs and circumscription
As in [11], we can extend the above mapping to the ﬁrst-order case. First of all, we extend logic programs to the ﬁrst-
order case. Let L be a relational ﬁrst-order language with equality, i.e. it has no proper functions. By an atom, we mean an
atomic formula including equality atoms.
In the following, let Σuna be the set of unique names assumptions on constants: c1 = c2 for any two distinct constants
c1 and c2.
A ﬁrst-order general logic program is a ﬁrst-order sentence in the following set:
F ::= ⊥ | A | F ∧ F | F ∨ F | F → F | ∀xF | ∃xF ,
where A is an atom, and x a variable. Again, for any general logic program F , ¬F is considered to be a shorthand for
F → ⊥.
Now let M be a ﬁnite model of Σuna with domain D . Let σ be the mapping from constants to D under M . Clearly, for
any distinct constants c1 and c2, σ(c1) = σ(c2). We say that M is a stable model of a ﬁrst-order general logic program F if
T (M), the set of ground facts true in M:
T (M) = {P (u) ∣∣ P a predicate, u ∈ PM}
is a stable model of the general logic program FM , the grounding of F on M obtained from F and M in two steps:
(1) First, replace every constant c in F by σ(c), every subformula of the form ∀xW in it by ∧u∈D W (x/u), and every
subformula of the form ∃xW in it by ∨u∈D W (x/u), where W (x/u) is the result of replacing every free occurrence of x
in W by u. The order by which these subformulas are replaced does not matter.
(2) In the expression obtained by the ﬁrst step, replace every equality atom u = u by , and every u = u′ for distinct u
and u′ by ⊥.
Example 7.1. Consider the following four programs:
F1 = ∃xp(x) ∧ ∃x
(¬p(x) → q),
F2 = ∃xp(x) ∧
[(∃x¬p(x))→ q],
F3 = ∃xp(x) ∧
[¬(∃xp(x))→ q],
F4 = ∃xp(x) ∧ ∀x
(¬p(x) → q).
Now consider a structure with two elements {a,b}. The grounding of the four programs on this domain are
(
p(a) ∨ p(b))∧ ((¬p(a) → q)∨ (¬p(b) → q)),(
p(a) ∨ p(b))∧ ((¬p(a) ∨ ¬p(b))→ q),(
p(a) ∨ p(b))∧ (¬(p(a) ∨ p(b))→ q),(
p(a) ∨ p(b))∧ (¬p(a) → q)∧ (¬p(b) → q),
respectively. So for this domain, F1 and F3 have the same stable models, {p(a)} and {p(b)}, and F2 and F4 have the same
stable models, {p(a),q} and {p(b),q}. It is easy to see that this is the case for any given domain: F1 and F3 have the same
stable models, and F2 and F4 have the same stable models.
We now show that the stable models of ﬁrst-order general logic programs can be captured in circumscription as well.
Let  be the set of predicates in the language. Let ′ be a set of new predicates, one for each P in  with the same arity
and denoted by P ′ . Now given a ﬁrst-order general logic program F , let C(F ) be the ﬁrst-order formula deﬁned inductively
as follows.
• C(⊥) is ⊥.
• If W is an atomic formula, then C(W ) is W .
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• C(∀xW ) is ∀xC(W ), and C(∃xW ) is ∃xC(W ).
• C(W1 → W2) is (C(W1) → C(W2)) ∧ (W ′1 → W ′2), where W ′ is the result of replacing every predicate P in W by P ′ .
The stable models of F are then the models of the circumscription of all the predicates in  in C(F ), together with the
following axiom∧
P∈
∀x(P (x) ↔ P ′(x)). (5)
Theorem 4. Let M be a ﬁnite model of Σuna. M is a stable model of F iff M ′ is a model of
Circum
(
C(F );)∧ (5), (6)
where M ′ is the conservative extension of M under (5).
Similar to Proposition 6.1, we have
Proposition 7.1. If
∧
P∈ ∀x(P (x) → P ′(x)) |
 C(F ) ↔ W , then (6) is equivalent to
Circum(W ;) ∧ (5).
Example 7.2. Consider the programs in Example 7.1.
• C(F1) is
∃xp(x) ∧ ∃x[(¬p(x) ∧ ¬p′(x) → q)∧ (¬p′(x) → q′)],
which is equivalent to ∃xp(x) ∧ (¬∃xp′(x) → q) under ∀x.p(x) → p′(x). Therefore, under (5), Circum(C(F1), {p,q}) is
equivalent to
∃!xp(x) ∧ ((¬∃xp′(x))↔ q),
thus equivalent to
∃!xp(x) ∧ ¬q,
which can be considered to be the ﬁrst-order semantics of F1. If D = {a,b}, then there are exactly two models of this
sentence, {p(a)} and {p(b)}.
• C(F2) is
∃xp(x) ∧ (∃x(¬p(x) ∧¬p′(x))→ q)∧ (∃x¬p′(x) → q′),
which is equivalent to
∃xp(x) ∧ (∃x¬p′(x) → q)
under ∀x.p(x) → p′(x). Therefore, Circum(C(F2), {p,q}) is equivalent to
∃!xp(x) ∧ (∃x¬p′(x) ↔ q),
under (5), thus equivalent to
∃!xp(x) ∧ ((∃x¬p(x))↔ q),
which can be considered to be the ﬁrst-order semantics of F2. If D = {a,b}, then there are exactly two models of this
sentence, {p(a),q} and {p(b),q}.
• C(F3) is
∃xp(x) ∧ (¬∃xp(x) ∧ ¬∃xp′(x) → q)∧ (¬∃xp′(x) → q′),
which is equivalent to C(F1) under (5). Thus F1 and F3 are equivalent under our semantics.
• C(F4) is
∃xp(x) ∧ ∀x[(¬p(x) ∧ ¬p′(x) → q)∧ (¬p′(x) → q′)],
which is equivalent to C(F2). Thus F2 and F4 are equivalent under our semantics.
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programs through grounding. For this to work, we need to assume a ﬁnite domain for otherwise a ﬁrst-order sentence such
as ∃xp(x) cannot be replaced by a propositional sentence. We also need the unique names assumption in order to eliminate
equality literals such as a = b or a = b.
Theorem 4 shows that this stable model semantics for ﬁrst-order logic programs can be captured by a simple formula (6)
using circumscription. However, while the stable model semantics makes the unique names and ﬁnite models assumptions,
the formula (6) is completely general and makes sense without these assumptions. Thus one could use this formula to
deﬁne the stable model semantics of ﬁrst-order logic programs in the general case. As it turned out, this will yield a
semantics that is essentially the same as the one proposed recently by Ferraris et al. [4]. More precisely, given a ﬁrst-order
sentence F , Ferraris et al. proposed a second-order sentence as its stable model semantics, and showed that this second-
order sentence is equivalent to (6) with all new predicates existentially quantiﬁed: ∃pϕ(P ′/p), where ϕ is formula (6), p a
tuple of predicate variables, one for each predicate P ′ in ϕ and with the same arity, and ϕ(P ′/p) is the result of replacing
each P ′ in ϕ by its corresponding variable in p.
8. Strong equivalence
The notion of strong equivalence [8] is important in logic programming. For disjunctive logic programs, research by Lin
and Chen [10] and Eiter et al. [1] show that interesting programs transformation rules can be designed based on the notion.
According to Ferraris and Lifschitz [3], two general logic programs F and G are said to be strongly equivalent if for any
formula F1 that contains an occurrence of F , F1 has the same stable models as the formula obtained from it by replacing
an occurrence of F by G . They showed that for any F and G , they are strongly equivalent iff F and G are equivalent in the
logic here-and-there.
As it turns out, our mapping from equilibrium logic to logic of GK also embeds logic of here-and-there to modal logic.
Thus the problem of deciding whether two programs are strongly equivalent can be reduced to checking whether certain
modal logic formulas are valid, and that, because of the special format of these modal formulas, can in turn be reduced to
checking whether certain propositional formulas are tautologies.
Theorem 5. Let F be a formula in equilibrium logic, X and Y two sets of atoms such that X ⊆ Y , and M a Kripke interpretation such
that K (M) = Th(X) and A(M) = Th(Y ). We have that 〈X, Y 〉 |
 F iff M |
 FGK .
Theorem 6. Let F and G be two general logic programs. The following conditions are equivalent.
1. F and G are strongly equivalent.
2.
∧
p∈Atom(Kp→ Ap) |
 (F ↔ G)GK .
3.
∧
p∈Atom(Kp→ Ap) |
 FGK ↔ GGK .
4.
∧
p∈Atom(p → p′) |
 C(F ↔ G).
5.
∧
p∈Atom(p → p′) |
 C(F ) ↔ C(G).
Corollary 7. The problem of deciding whether two general logic programs are strongly equivalent is co-NP complete.
9. Conclusion
We showed that the logic of GK proposed by Lin and Shoham is ﬂexible enough to handle stable model semantics of
general logic programs. Because of this, the stable model semantics of general logic programs can also be formulated in
circumscription, in both propositional and ﬁrst-order cases. For future work, we plan to make use of the expressive power
of GK in other applications.
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Appendix A. Proofs of theorems
A.1. Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 1. Let F be a general logic program; X and Y two sets of atoms such that X ⊆ Y and M a Kripke interpretation such that
K (M) = Th(X), A(M) = Th(Y ). We have that X |
 F Y iff M |
 FGK .
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F X ∧ GX , and (F ∨ G)X equivalent to F X ∨ GX . Thus by induction on the structure of F , it’s easy to see that Y |
 F iff
M |
 F A , where M is as in the proposition.
We now prove that X |
 F Y iff M |
 FGK by induction on the structure of F .
• If F is ⊥, then this assertion holds obviously.
• If F is an atom p, then pGK is Kp. X |
 pY iff p ∈ X . On the other hand, M |
 Kp iff p ∈ X too. Therefore, X |
 pY iff
M |
 pGK .
• If F is G ∧ H , X |
 (G ∧ H)Y iff X |
 GY and X |
 HY . By induction hypothesis, this holds iff M |
 GGK and M |
 HGK ,
which is equivalent to M |
 (G ∧ H)GK .
• If F is G ∨ H , X |
 (G ∨ H)Y iff X |
 GY or X |
 HY . By induction hypothesis, this holds iff M |
 GGK or M |
 HGK , which
is equivalent to M |
 (G ∨ H)GK .
• Finally, if F is G → H . X |
 (G → H)Y iff Y |
 G → H and X |
 GY → HY iff (i) Y |
 G → H and (ii) X |
 GY or X |
 HY .
By induction hypothesis, this holds iff (i) M |
 (G → H)A and (ii) M |
 GGK or M |
 HGK iff M |
 (G → H)GK .
This completes the induction proof. 
Theorem 2. Let X be a set of atoms and F a general logic program. The following two statements are equivalent.
(1) X is a stable model of F .
(2) There is a GK model M of FGK such that K (M) = A(M) = Th(X).
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2): Suppose that X is a stable model of F . We can construct a Kripke interpretation M such that K (M) =
A(M) = Th(X). We now prove that M is a GK model of FGK . Firstly, we have X |
 F X since X is a stable model of F . By
Lemma 1, M |
 FGK . We only need to prove M is a minimal model. We prove it by contradiction. Assume that M is not a
minimal model of FGK , then there exists another model M1 of FGK such that A(M1) = A(M) = Th(X) and K (M1) ⊂ K (M).
We construct another Kripke interpretation M2 such that A(M2) = Th(X) and K (M2) = Th(X1), where X1 = {p | M1 |
 Kp,
p ∈ Atom}. For any general logic program G , by induction on the structure of G , it’s easy to see that M2 is a model of GGK
iff M1 is a model of GGK . Therefore, M2 is a model of FGK . By Lemma 1, X1 |
 F X . Moreover, X1 ⊂ X . This shows that X is
not a stable model of F , a contradiction. Hence, M is a GK model of FGK .
(1) ⇐ (2): Suppose that there is a GK model M of FGK such that K (M) = A(M) = Th(X). By Lemma 1, X |
 F X . There is
no proper subset X1 of X such that X1 |
 F X . Otherwise, we can construct a Kripke interpretation M1 such that K (M1) =
Th(X1) and A(M1) = Th(X). By Lemma 1, M1 is also a model of FGK . Moreover K (M1) ⊂ K (M); A(M1) = A(M). This shows
that M is not a GK model of FGK , a contradiction. Hence, X is a stable model of F . 
A.2. Proof of Theorem 3
Notice that C(F ) can also be deﬁned recursively as follows.
• C(⊥) is ⊥.
• If F is an atom, then C(F ) is F .
• C(F1  F2) is C(F1)  C(F2), where  is ∧ or ∨.
• C(F1 → F2) is (C(F1) → C(F2)) ∧ (F ′1 → F ′2), where F ′ is the expression obtained from F by replacing every atom p
by p′ .
Lemma 2. Let F be a general logic program, X and Y two sets of atoms, and M a Kripke interpretation such that K (M) = Th(X),
A(M) = Th(Y ). We have that X ∪ Y ′ is a model of C(F ) iff M |
 FGK .
Proof. We prove this by induction on the structure of F .
• If F is ⊥, then this assertion holds obviously.
• If F is an atom p, then pGK is Kp, C(F ) is p. X ∪ Y ′ |
 p iff p ∈ X . On the other hand, M |
 Kp iff p ∈ X too. Therefore,
X ∪ Y ′ |
 C(p) iff M |
 pGK .
• If F is G ∧ H , X ∪ Y ′ |
 C(G ∧ H) iff X ∪ Y ′ |
 C(G) and X ∪ Y ′ |
 C(H). By induction hypothesis, this holds iff M |
 GGK
and M |
 HGK , which is equivalent to M |
 (G ∧ H)GK .
• If F is G ∨ H , X ∪ Y ′ |
 C(G ∨ H) iff X ∪ Y ′ |
 C(G) or X ∪ Y ′ |
 C(H). By induction hypothesis, this holds iff M |
 GGK
or M |
 HGK , which is equivalent to M |
 (G ∨ H)GK .
• Finally, if F is G → H . X ∪ Y ′ |
 C(G → H) iff X ∪ Y ′ |
 (C(G) → C(H))∧ (G → H)′ iff X ∪ Y ′ |
 (G → H)′ and X ∪ Y ′ |

C(G) → C(H) iff (i) X ∪ Y ′ |
 (G → H)′ and (ii) X ∪ Y ′ |
 C(G) or X ∪ Y ′ |
 C(H). Notice that X ∪ Y ′ |
 (G → H)′ iff
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 (G → H)′ iff Y |
 G → H iff M |
 (G → H)A . By induction hypothesis, X ∪ Y ′ |
 C(F ) iff (i) M |
 (G → H)A and (ii)
M |
 GGK or M |
 HGK iff M |
 (G → H)GK .
This completes the induction proof. 
Theorem 3. For any general logic program F in the language Atom, any set X ⊆ Atom, the following two statements are equivalent
(1) There is a GK model M of FGK such that K (M) = A(M) = Th(X).
(2) X ∪ X ′ is a model of∧
p∈Atom
(
p ↔ p′)∧ Circum(C(F );Atom). (4)
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2): Suppose that M is a GK model of FGK and K (M) = A(M) = Th(X). Then M |
 FGK , by Lemma 2, X ∪ X ′
is a model of C(F ). We now show that for any set of atoms such that X1 ⊂ X , X1 ∪ X ′ is not a model of C(F ). Suppose
otherwise, X1 ∪ X ′ is a model of C(F ). Construct a GK interpretation M1 such that K (M1) = Th(X1) and A(M1) = Th(X).
By Lemma 2, M1 |
 FGK . It’s clear that K (M1) ⊂ K (M), A(M1) = A(M). This shows that M is not a GK model of FGK ,
a contradiction. Therefore, X ∪ X ′ is a model of Circum(C(F );Atom). Of course, X ∪ X ′ is a model of ∧p∈Atom(p ↔ p′). This
shows that statement (1) implies statement (2).
(1) ⇐ (2): Suppose that X ∪ X ′ is a model of Circum(C(F );Atom). Thus X ∪ X ′ is a model of C(F ) and for every proper
subset X1 of X , X1 ∪ X ′ is not a model of C(F ). Let M be a Kripke interpretation such that K (M) = A(M) = Th(X). We now
prove that M is a GK model of FGK . According to Lemma 2, M |
 FGK . We only need to prove that M is a minimal model.
We prove it by contradiction. Assume that M is not a minimal model of FGK . Then there exists another model M1 of FGK
such that A(M1) = A(M) = Th(X) and K (M1) ⊂ K (M). Construct another Kripke interpretation M2 such that A(M2) = Th(X)
and K (M2) = Th(X1), where X1 = {p | M1 |
 Kp, p ∈ Atom}. For any general logic program G , by induction on the structure
of G , M2 is a model of GGK iff M1 is a model of GGK . Therefore, M2 is a model of FGK . By Lemma 2, X1 ∪ X ′ |
 C(F ).
Moreover, X1 ⊂ X . X ∪ X ′ is not a model of Circum(C(F );Atom), a contradiction. Hence, M is a GK model of FGK . This shows
that statement (2) implies statement (1). 
A.3. Proof of Theorem 4
Let L be a ﬁrst order language with equality but without proper functions. Let C be the set of constants in L, and  the
set of predicates in L. Let ′ = {P ′ | P ∈ } be a set of new predicates, and L′ the extension of L by the new predicates
in ′ .
A ﬁrst-order structure M ′ of L′ is said to be a conservative extension of a ﬁrst-order structure M of L if M ′ and M have
the same domain, and they interpret all symbols in L the same. Suppose that M ′ is a conservative extension of M . It is easy
to see that if M is a model of Σuna , then M ′ is also a model of Σuna , and that for every sentence F , FM and FM′ are the
same.
Let F be a ﬁrst order general logic program in L, and M a ﬁnite model of Σuna . We remark that FM can also be deﬁned
recursively as follows (recall that σ is the mapping from constants in L to the domain of M under M).
• ⊥M is ⊥.
• If F is a = b, where a and b are two constants, then FM is  when σ(a) is the same as σ(b), otherwise FM is ⊥.
• If F is an atomic formula P (t), where t is a vector of constants, then FM is P (σ (t)), where σ(t) is 〈σ(t1), . . . , σ (tn)〉
when t is 〈t1, . . . , tn〉.
• (G  H)M is GM  HM , where  is ∧, ∨ or →.
• (∃xF )M is ∨u∈D F (x/u)M .• (∀xF )M is ∧u∈D F (x/u)M .
Thus given a ﬁrst order general logic program F in L, FM is a propositional formula in A(M), the set of ground atoms
in M:
A(M) = {P (u) ∣∣ P an n-ary predicate, u ∈ Dn, D the domain of M},
and C(FM) is a propositional formula in A(M) ∪ A(M)′ .
Let M be a ﬁrst-order structure. Recall that T (M) is the set of ground atoms true in M:
T (M) = {P (u) ∣∣ P a predicate, u ∈ PM}.
Lemma 3. Let M be a ﬁnite model of Σuna, and F a ﬁrst order general logic program. We have that M is a model of F iff T (M) is a
model of FM .
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• If F is ⊥, then this assertion holds obviously.
• If F is a = b, where a, b are constants, then FM is  when a and b are the same; FM is ⊥ when a and b are two
distinct constants. On the other hand, since M is a model of Σuna , M is a model of F iff a is the same with b. Therefore
this assertion holds.
• If F is an atomic formula p(t), where t is a vector of constants, then FM is p(σ (t)). M is a model of F iff σ(t) ∈ pM iff
p(σ (t)) ∈ T (M) iff T (M) is a model of FM .
• If F is G ∧ H , then FM is GM ∧ HM . M is a model of F iff M is a model of G ∧ H iff M is a model of G and F is a
model of H iff T (M) is a model of GM and T (M) is a model of HM iff T (M) is a model of GM ∧ HM iff T (M) is a
model of FM .
• If F is G ∨ H , then FM is GM ∨ HM . M is a model of F iff M is a model of G ∨ H iff M is a model of G or F is a model
of H iff T (M) is a model of GM or T (M) is a model of HM iff T (M) is a model of GM ∨ HM iff T (M) is a model of FM .
• If F is G → H , then FM is GM → HM . M is a model of F iff M is a model of G → H iff M is not a model of G or F is
a model of H iff T (M) is not a model of GM or T (M) is a model of HM iff T (M) is a model of GM → HM iff T (M) is a
model of FM .
• If F is ∃xG , then FM is ∨u∈D(G(x/u))M . M is a model of F iff there exists u ∈ D such that M is a model of G(x/u) iff
there exists u ∈ D such that T (M) is a model of (G(x/u))M iff T (M) is a model of ∨u∈D(G(x/u))M iff T (M) is a model
of FM .
• If F is ∀xG , then FM is ∧u∈D(G(x/u))M . M is a model of F iff for all u ∈ D , M is a model of G(x/u) iff for all u ∈ D ,
T (M) is a model of (G(x/u))M iff T (M) is a model of
∧
u∈D(G(x/u))M iff T (M) is a model of F . 
Lemma 4. Let M be a ﬁnite model of Σuna, and F a ﬁrst order general logic program. We have that C(FM) is equivalent to C(F )M.
Proof. We prove it by induction on the structure of F .
• If F is ⊥, this assertion holds obviously.
• F is a = b, where a, b are constants. If a is the same with b, then both C(FM) and (C(F ))M are , otherwise both of
them are ⊥.
• F is an atomic formula p(t). Then FM is p(σ (t)), C(FM) is also p(σ (t)). On the other hand, C(F ) is p(t), (C(F ))M is
p(σ (t)) too.
• F is G∧ H . Then C(FM) is equivalent to C(GM)∧C(HM), which is equivalent to (C(G))M ∧ (C(H))M , which is equivalent
to (C(G) ∧ C(H))M , which is equivalent to (C(G ∧ H))M , which is (C(F ))M .
• F is G∨ H . Then C(FM) is equivalent to C(GM)∨C(HM), which is equivalent to (C(G))M ∨ (C(H))M , which is equivalent
to (C(G) ∨ C(H))M , which is equivalent to (C(G ∨ H))M , which is (C(F ))M .
• F is G → H . Then C(FM) is C(GM → HM), which is equivalent to (C(GM) → C(HM))∧ (G ′M → H ′M), which is equivalent
to (C(G)M → C(H)M) ∧ (G ′M → H ′M). On the other hand, C(F )M is equivalent to ((C(G) → C(H)) ∧ (G ′ → H ′))M , which
is equivalent to (C(G)M → C(H)M)∧ (G ′M → H ′M). Moreover, it’s easy to see that for any ﬁrst order sentence H and any
structure M , H ′M is the same as (HM)′ . Hence, this assertion holds.• If F is ∃xG , then FM is ∨u∈D(G(x/u))M . C(FM) is ∨u∈D C((G(x/u))M ), which is equivalent to ∨u∈D(C(G(x/u))M). On
the other hand, C(F ) is ∃xC(G), (C(F ))M is ∨u∈D(C(G)(x/u))M . Moreover, by induction on the structure, it’s easy to
see that for any ﬁrst order formula H , C(H(x/u)) is equivalent to C(H)(x/u). Hence, this assertion holds.
• If F is ∀xG , then FM is ∧u∈D(G(x/u))M . C(FM) is ∧u∈D C((G(x/u))M), which is equivalent to ∧u∈D(C(G(x/u))M). On
the other hand, C(F ) is ∀xC(G), (C(F ))M is ∧u∈D(C(G)(x/u))M . Similarly, this assertion holds. 
Lemma5. Let M be a ﬁnitemodel ofΣuna, M ′ a conservative extension of M under (5), and F a ﬁrst order sentence. Then T (M)∪T (M)′
is a model of C(FM) iff M ′ is a model of C(F ).
Proof. Since M ′ is a conservative extension of M under (5), T (M ′) = T (M) ∪ T (M)′ .
M ′ is a model of C(F )
iff
T (M ′) is a model of C(F )M′ (Lemma 3)
iff
T (M) ∪ T (M)′ is a model of C(F )M
iff
T (M) ∪ T (M)′ is a model of C(FM) (Lemma 4). 
Let M and M∗ be two ﬁrst order structures on L′ and  the set of predicates in L. We say that M∗ is less than M on ,
written by M∗ ⊂ M , if and only if:
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(2) M and M∗ map every constant c in C into the same element in D .
(3) For each p′ ∈ ′ , u ∈ p′M∗ iff u ∈ p′M .
(4) For all p ∈ , if u ∈ pM∗ , then u ∈ pM .
(5) There is a p ∈  and some u such that u ∈ pM and u /∈ pM∗i .
Thus M is a model of Circum(F ;) if and only if M is a model of F and there is no M∗ ⊂ M such that M∗ is also a model
of F .
Lemma 6. Let M be a ﬁnite model of Σuna, M ′ a conservative extension of M under (5), F a ﬁrst order sentence, and S ⊆ A(M). We
have that
(1) S ⊂ T (M) iff there is M∗ such that M∗ ⊂ M ′ and T (M∗) = S ∪ T (M)′ .
(2) For any M∗ such that M∗ ⊂ M ′ and T (M∗) = S ∪ T (M)′ , S ∪ T (M)′ is a model of C(FM) iff M∗ is a model of C(F ).
Proof. (1) is obvious. Proof of (2):
M∗ is a model of C(F )
iff
T (M∗) is a model of C(F )M∗ (Lemma 3)
iff
S ∪ T (M)′ is a model of C(F )M∗
iff
S ∪ T (M)′ is a model of C(F )M (M and M∗ have the same domain and interpret all constants the same)
iff
S ∪ T (M)′ is a model of C(FM) (Lemma 4). 
Theorem 4. Let M be a ﬁnite model of Σuna. M is a stable model of F iff M ′ is a model of
Circum
(
C(F );)∧ (5), (6)
where M ′ is the conservative extension of M under (5).
Proof. M is a stable model of F
iff
T (M) is a stable model of FM (by the deﬁnition)
iff
T (M) ∪ T (M)′ is a model of ∧p∈A(M)(p ↔ p′) ∧ Circum(C(FM); A(M)) (by Theorem 3)
iff
• T (M) ∪ T (M)′ is a model of ∧p∈A(M)(p ↔ p′);
• T (M) ∪ T (M)′ is a model of C(FM);
• for any S ⊆ A(M), if S ⊂ T (M), then S ∪ T (M)′ is not a model of C(FM)
iff
• M ′ is a model of (5);
• M ′ is a model of C(F ) (by Lemma 5);
• for any ﬁrst order structure M∗ , if M∗ ⊂ M ′ , then M∗ is not a model of C(F ) (by Lemma 6)
iff M ′ is a model of (6). 
A.4. Proof of Theorems 5 and 6
Theorem 5. Let F be a general logic program; X and Y two sets of atoms such that X ⊆ Y and M a Kripke interpretation such that
K (M) = Th(X), A(M) = Th(Y ). We have that 〈X, Y 〉 |
 F iff M |
 FGK .
Proof. As stated in [2], 〈X, Y 〉 |
 F iff X |
 F Y . According to Lemma 1, X |
 F Y iff M |
 FGK , therefore, this assertion
holds. 
Theorem 6. Let F and G be two general logic programs. The following statements are equivalent.
1. F and G are strongly equivalent.
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∧
p∈Atom(Kp→ Ap) |
 (F ↔ G)GK .
3.
∧
p∈Atom(Kp→ Ap) |
 FGK ↔ GGK .
4.
∧
p∈Atom(p → p′) |
 C(F ↔ G).
5.
∧
p∈Atom(p → p′) |
 C(F ) ↔ C(G).
Proof. 1 ⇒ 2: Let M be a model of ∧p∈Atom(Kp → Ap). Construct a Kripke interpretation M1 such that K (M1) = Th(X)
and A(M1) = Th(Y ), where X = {p | M |
 Kp, p ∈ Atom}; Y = {p | M |
 Ap, p ∈ Atom}. It’s clear that M1 |
 (F ↔ G)GK iff
M |
 (F ↔ G)GK . Since M is a model of ∧p∈Atom(Kp → Ap), X ⊆ Y . Therefore 〈X, Y 〉 is an HT-interpretation. Since F and G
are assumed to be strongly equivalent, they are equivalent in the logic of here-and-there. Thus 〈X, Y 〉 |
 F ↔ G . Then by
Theorem 5, M1 |
 (F ↔ G)GK . Therefore, M |
 (F ↔ G)GK . This shows that ∧p∈Atom(Kp→ Ap) |
 (F ↔ G)GK .
2⇒ 3: (F ↔ G)GK is ((F → G) ∧ (G → F ))GK , which is equivalent to (F → G)GK ∧ (G → F )GK , which is equivalent to
(FGK → GGK) ∧ (F A → GA) ∧ (GGK → FGK) ∧ (GA → F A),
which is equivalent to (FGK ↔ GGK) ∧ (F A ↔ GA). This shows that (F ↔ G)GK |
 FGK ↔ GGK . Hence, this assertion holds.
3 ⇒ 1: We ﬁrst show that if ∧p∈Atom(Kp → Ap) |
 FGK ↔ GGK , then F is classically equivalent to G . Suppose otherwise,
without loss of generality, X is a model of F but not a model of G . By the deﬁnition of reduction, it’s clear that X is a
model of F X . Construct a Kripke interpretation M such that K (M) = A(M) = Th(X). By Lemma 1, M is a model of FGK .
Thus, M is also a model of GGK . Again by Lemma 1, X is a model of GX . Thus, X is a model of G , a contradiction. Hence, if∧
p∈Atom(Kp→ Ap) |
 FGK ↔ GGK , then F is classically equivalent to G . Therefore, F A is equivalent to GA .
Suppose that H is a general logic program and it contains an occurrence of F , H1 is the general logic program obtained
from H by replacing an occurrence of F in H by G . We now show that H has the same set of stable models as H1. By 3,∧
p∈Atom(Kp → Ap) |
 FGK ↔ GGK . Therefore, by induction on the structure of H , it’s easy to see that
∧
p∈Atom(Kp → Ap) |

HGK ↔ (H1)GK . Thus, HGK and (H1)GK has the same set of GK models. By Theorem 2, H has the same set of stable models
as H1.
2⇒ 4: Suppose ∧p∈Atom(Kp→ Ap) |
 (F ↔ G)GK . Now, suppose that X and Y are two sets of atoms and X∪Y ′ is a model
of
∧
p∈Atom(p → p′). Therefore, X ⊆ Y . Construct a Kripke interpretation M such that K (M) = Th(X) and A(M) = Th(Y ). We
have that M is a model of
∧
p∈Atom(Kp → Ap). By 2, it’s also a model of (F ↔ G)GK . By Lemma 2, X ∪ Y ′ is a model of
C(F ↔ G). This shows that ∧p∈Atom(p → p′) |
 C(F ↔ G).
4⇒ 5: Similar to the proof of 2⇒ 3, C(F ↔ G) |
 C(F ) ↔ C(G). Hence, this assertion holds.
5⇒ 1: Similar to the proof of 3⇒ 1. 
Let F be a propositional formula constructed with atoms and basic connectives (⊥, ∧, ∨ and →). Let Length(F ) be the
total number of atoms and ⊥ occurring in F .
Lemma 7.
Length
(
C(F )
)

(
Length(F ) + 1)(Length(F ) + 2)/2− 2.
Proof. We prove this assertion by induction on the structure of F .
• If F is ⊥, then Length(F ) = Length(C(F )) = 1. This assertion holds.
• If F is an atom p, then Length(F ) = Length(C(F )) = 1. This assertion holds as well.
• If F is G ∧ H or G ∨ H , then Length(C(F )) = Length(C(G)) + Length(C(H))  (Length(G) + 1)(Length(G) + 2)/2 −
2 + (Length(H) + 1)(Length(H) + 2)/2 − 2  (Length(G) + Length(H) + 1)(Length(G) + Length(H) + 2)/2 − 2 (which is
equivalent to 0 Length(G)Length(H) + 1) (Length(F ) + 1)(Length(F ) + 2)/2− 2.
• Finally, if F is G → H , then Length(C(F )) = Length(C(G)) + Length(C(H)) + Length(F )  (Length(G) + 1)(Length(G) +
2)/2 − 2 + (Length(H) + 1)(Length(H) + 2)/2 − 2 + Length(G) + Length(H)  (Length(G) + Length(H) + 1)(Length(G) +
Length(H)+2)/2−2 (which is equivalent to 0 (Length(G)−1)(Length(H)−1)) (Length(F )+1)(Length(F )+2)/2−2.
This completes the proof. 
Corollary 7. The problem of deciding whether two general logic programs are strongly equivalent is co-NP complete.
Proof. This assertion follows straightforwardly from Theorem 6 and Lemma 7. 
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